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THE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
AND THE CASE OF BAHRAIN 
INTRODUCTION 
he evolution of international law towards a system capable of 
promoting “global justice” has been accompanied by a growing 
consensus that States bear an obligation both to punish wrongdoers and 
to act on behalf of victims in the wake of widespread, systematic human 
rights abuses.1 In fact, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 60/147, Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Se-
rious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, sets forth “existing,” 
complementary international legal obligations of States in this arena 
without introducing new obligations.2 The right to a remedy is premised 
on three core rights: (1) the right to “equal and effective access to jus-
tice”; (2) “the right to adequate, effective and prompt reparation for the 
harm suffered”; and (3) “the right to truth.”3 Despite being a U.N. Mem-
ber State since September 21, 1971,4 the Kingdom of Bahrain (“Ba-
hrain”) is a nation with a disturbing legacy of unaddressed human rights 
abuses and impunity for perpetrators.5 Such incongruence raises funda-
mental questions with respect to the current international legal frame-
                                                                                                             
 1. Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law, and Global Justice: A New Fron-
tier, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 478, 478–79 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2006). See 
also PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS 170 (2002). 
 2. G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 
Principles]. In addition to the 2006 Principles, the U.N. General Assembly previously 
addressed the rights of victims in adopting the 1985 Declaration of Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power. However, the 1985 Declaration focus-
es on the rights of victims of domestic crimes whereas the 2006 Principles are essentially 
“an international bill of rights of victims.” M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Recogni-
tion of Victim’s Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203 (2006). 
 3. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 260. 
 4. See United Nations List of Member States, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2007). 
 5. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE: A SURVEY OF LAW & PRACTICE: BAHRAIN 
COUNTRY REPORT S. 2.1 (May 2003) [hereinafter REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE]. 
See also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ROUTINE ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL: CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN BAHRAIN 10 (1997) [hereinafter HRW, ROUTINE ABUSE, 
ROUTINE DENIAL]; REDRESS, SUBMISSION OF THE REDRESS TRUST TO THE MEETING ON 
BAHRAIN—THE HOUSE OF LORDS 2 (Aug. 2004). 
T
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work and the complex moral, legal, and political challenges involved in 
any reparations process.6 
Located off of the eastern coast of Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf, 
Bahrain sits in the center of the highly complicated and volatile Middle 
East region.7 With a population of approximately 718,000,8 Bahrain is 
the smallest of the six Persian Gulf States that make up the Gulf Cooper-
ative Council (“GCC”).9 However, due in large part to its historical ante-
cedents—the Sunni al-Khalifa tribe wrested control of the archipelago 
from indirect Persian rule in 1782, and subsequently sought to consoli-
date and maintain power—Bahrain is considered “the most complex and 
stratified of the Gulf states.”10 Today, members of the al-Khalifa family 
and their “Sunni tribal allies” exercise most of the political and economic 
power in Bahrain.11 At the bottom of the “social and political hierarchy” 
are the al-Baharinah indigenous Shiite Arabs and all Persians regardless 
of sect.12 Despite comprising approximately seventy percent of Bahrain’s 
population, Shiites continue to endure systematic discrimination.13 
                                                                                                             
 6. See OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 345, 481–82 (K. De Feyter, S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt & P. 
Lemmens eds., 2005); DINA SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
(2d ed. 2005). 
 7. There have been three major wars in the Gulf States alone over the past twenty-
five years: the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), the Persian Gulf War (1991), and Operation 
Iraqi Freedom (2003–present). KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31533, 
THE PERSIAN GULF STATES: ISSUES FOR U.S. POLICY 1 (2006) [hereinafter CRS REPORT 
RL 31533]. 
 8. C.I.A. World Factbook: Bahrain, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/ba.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2007). See also INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 
GROUP, BAHRAIN’S SECTARIAN CHALLENGE 7 (2005) [hereinafter ICG REPORT]. Non-
Bahrainis comprise nearly 290,000 people, or forty percent of the population, and ac-
count for sixty-four percent of the workforce. Id.; CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7. 
 9. The other five GCC states are Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. 
 10. ICG Report, supra note 8, at 1; C.I.A. World Factbook: Bahrain, supra note 8. 
 11. ICG Report, supra note 8, at 5. According to the International Crisis Group, 
members of the royal family occupy at least 100 of the top 572 government posts, includ-
ing 24 of 47 cabinet-level posts, 15 of the top 30 in the Ministry of the Interior, 6 of the 
top 12 in the Ministry of Justice, and 7 of the top 28 in the Ministry of Defense. Id. See 
also C.I.A. World Leaders: Bahrain, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-
leaders-1/world-leaders-b/bahrain.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2007). After the al-Khalifa 
family and their “Sunni tribal allies” are other descendants of Sunni Arab tribes and then 
hawalah, Iranian Sunni and Arab immigrants to Bahrain of over a century or more. ICG 
Report, supra note 8, at 1. 
 12. ICG Report, supra note 8, at 1. 
 13. Id. The ongoing government ban of the 2006 “Al-Bandar report” released by the 
Gulf Centre for Democratic Development does little to dispel this perception. The report 
details a conspiracy led and funded by known official organizations, most notably the 
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The story of Bahrain’s past and present bears telling for three primary 
reasons. First, on a universal level, it is important to raise awareness of 
the experiences of victims14 of grave human rights violations and to pro-
mote accountability. Second, on a geopolitical level, the United States 
has a major stake in the stability of Bahrain15 and developments in the 
                                                                                                             
Royal Court, to ensure the sustained political and economic dominance of the Sunni mi-
nority to the exclusion of Bahrain’s Shiite majority. The report includes evidence of plans 
to fix elections, to undermine dissident groups, to disenfranchise Shiite populations, to 
restrict the operation of civic organizations, and to facilitate a change in the country’s 
demographics through pro-Sunni immigration policies. International Freedom of Expres-
sion Exchange, Authorities Reinforce Sweeping Media Ban, Internet Censorship on Con-
troversial Report, http://canada.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/88028/ (last visited Dec. 19, 
2007). 
 14. For purposes of this Note, the term “victim” should be understood consistent with 
the 2006 Principles and defined as 
[p]ersons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of 
their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that constitute gross viola-
tions of international human rights law, or serious violations of international 
humanitarian law. Where appropriate . . . the term “victim” also includes the 
immediate family or dependents of the direct victim and persons who have suf-
fered harm in intervening to assist victims in distress or to prevent victimiza-
tion. 
2006 Principles, supra note 2, para. 8. 
 15. CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 95-1013, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy 
3 (Apr. 23, 2007). In an effort to protect itself from its powerful neighbors, Bahrain culti-
vated a strategic alliance with the United States centered on defense issues. Id. The U.S. 
naval command has maintained a presence in Bahrain since 1938, and the Fifth Fleet is 
currently headquartered in Juffair, Bahrain. The headquarters is responsible for coordinat-
ing support missions by U.S. warships in the Iraq War, and conducting counter-terrorism 
and counter-narcotrafficking operations in the Arabian Sea. Id. at 4. After the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration took extensive measures to fur-
ther strengthen the U.S.-Bahrain relationship. The two countries renewed a ten-year de-
fense agreement in October 2001, which “provides U.S. access to Bahraini bases during a 
crisis, the pre-positioning of strategic material (mostly U.S. Air Force munitions), consul-
tations with Bahrain if its security is threatened, and expanded exercises and U.S. training 
of Bahraini forces.” Id. at 4. In March 2002, President Bush made Bahrain a major non-
NATO ally, a status that allows for U.S. arms sales. Id. Moreover, the U.S. Congress 
identified access to Bahrain-based military installations and airspace as critical to U.S. 
military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa in addition to contingen-
cy operations or force projections in the Gulf and Southwest Asia. Human Rights Watch, 
Bahrain: Events of 2006, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/bahrai14699.htm 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2007). The Bush administration requested an estimated $17.3 mil-
lion in military aid for Bahrain in 2007. Id. 
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Persian Gulf region more generally.16 Third, on a historical level, a suc-
cessful transitional justice experience in Bahrain could lend further sup-
port to the precedent established by the Equity and Reconciliation Com-
mission (“IER”) in Morocco, and encourage other Gulf States, such as 
Saudi Arabia, to make similar efforts to resolve mass human rights viola-
tions. 
Beginning shortly after Bahrain achieved independence in 1971 and 
continuing through the mid-1990s, the Bahraini government undertook a 
campaign of political repression that targeted opposition activists, left-
ists, unionists, and others perceived as threats to the State.17 Hundreds of 
Bahrainis and their families were forcibly exiled, and the use of torture 
was “endemic.”18 Under the leadership of King Hamad, who assumed 
power following the death of his father Amir ‘Isa in 1999, Bahrain has 
undergone a series of political reforms and has slowly begun to confront 
its past.19 In this vein, the King has expressed interest in pursuing nation-
al reconciliation and transitional justice to confront Bahrain’s legacy of 
human rights abuses.20 In January 2006, the decision was made to pro-
vide monthly payments of $660 (250 Bahraini dinars) to 250 families 
with either unemployed or elderly former exiles allowed back to the isl-
                                                                                                             
 16. CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7, at  26. Approximately fifty-seven percent of 
the world’s proven oil reserves (715 billion barrels) and about forty-five percent of the 
world’s proven natural gas reserves (2462 trillion cubic feet) are located in Iran, Iraq, and 
the GCC States. The United States imports about twenty percent of its net oil imports 
from the Gulf States. Id. 
 17. See HRW, ROUTINE ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL, supra note 5, at 11; REDRESS, 
REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5. 
 18. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5. See also HRW, ROUTINE 
ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL, supra note 5, at 11; REDRESS, SUBMISSION OF THE REDRESS 
TRUST TO THE MEETING ON BAHRAIN—THE HOUSE OF LORDS, supra note 5. 
 19. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties 
Under Article 19 of the Convention (Continued), para. 33, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/SR.656 
(May 24, 2005) [hereinafter CAT Comm. 1]. Government officials refer to the initiative 
as the “reform programme,” which is intended to “address long-festering domestic ten-
sions, to establish a constitutional regime and to introduce political reforms.” The pro-
gram includes the highly controversial amnesty laws Legislative Decree No. 10 of 2001 
and Legislative Decree No. 56 of 2002. Id. 
 20. Comm. Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties 
Under Article 19 of the Convention, Comments by the Government of Bahrain to the 
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/BHR/CO/1/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2007) [hereinafter CAT Bahrain Comments]. 
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and as part of the reform program.21 However, there is only one known 
instance to date of government compensation to a victim of torture.22 
It is important to recognize the two different ways in which the term 
“reparations” is used.23 Within the context of international law, the term 
connotes the array of measures available to redress the different harms 
that a victim may have suffered due to certain crimes.24 Therefore, under 
international law, reparations may include restitution, compensation, re-
habilitation, and satisfaction and guarantees of nonrecurrence.25 Such 
measures, which include material and moral (or “symbolic”) undertak-
ings by a society in individual or collective form, seek to restore the vic-
tim to the status quo ante by expressing a society’s “recognition, remorse 
and atonement for harms inflicted.”26 Material reparations may include 
monetary compensation, service packages providing healthcare or coun-
seling to promote rehabilitation, restoration of property rights, or a 
pension.27 Moral, or symbolic, reparations focus on allowing the victim’s 
story to be told and promoting a sense of (nonlegal) justice, and may in-
clude official apologies, rehabilitation, and the creation of memorials or 
other acts of remembrance.28 For reasons to be discussed later, symbolic 
reparations may prove more valuable in facilitating the healing sought 
through any material reparations process.29 
However, the term is often used in a more narrow sense to refer to “the 
design of programs (i.e., more or less coordinated sets of reparative 
measures) with massive coverage.”30 Historically, most reparations pro-
                                                                                                             
 21. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2006: 
BAHRAIN (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/ci/81995.htm (last visited Sept. 
1, 2007) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 2006: BAHRAIN]. 
 22. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 14. 
 23. Pablo De Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, 
supra note 1, at 451, 453. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 157, 157–58 (2004). 
 27. HAYNER, supra note 1, at 182 (“[F]or those left destitute from the loss of a 
breadwinner in the family, or left emotionally or physically shattered, financial repara-
tion, basic medical benefits, and other support services will be necessary in order to begin 
to repair the damage.”); De Greiff, supra note 23, at 453; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 
157–58. 
 28. De Greiff, supra note 23, at 453 
 29. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 180. 
 30. De Greiff, supra note 23, at 453. In analyzing the design of reparations programs, 
De Greiff believes emphasis should be placed on three goals: recognition, civic trust, and 
social solidarity. Id. at 451. 
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grams have incorporated elements of both connotations of the term.31 
Such overlapping is logical given that settlement of court cases has often 
directly or indirectly resulted in the formation of “administrative com-
pensation schemes.”32 This Note will address both contexts. Neverthe-
less, unless otherwise indicated, the term “reparations” will refer to the 
broader meaning as understood in international law. 
This Note makes two central propositions. First, the existing interna-
tional legal framework for reparations to victims of mass human rights 
violations is inadequate as evidenced by the current situation in Ba-
hrain.33 At least in the short term, legal recognition of a victim’s right to 
reparations without an effective enforcement mechanism at the interna-
tional level ultimately perpetuates the cycle of victimization for those 
whom the pronouncement of such principles seeks to protect.34 Not only 
must Bahraini victims of state abuse suffer the indignities of their mi-
streatment while being denied access to justice at the domestic level, but 
they are also reassured of their rights by an international legal framework 
incapable of guaranteeing them justice, thereby reinforcing their position 
of helplessness.35 Nevertheless, at the supranational level, there is an 
                                                                                                             
 31. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 157, 165. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 203, 260 (discussing a theory of victims’ rights 
and advocating “for a strengthening of current victims’ rights norms”). See also Roht-
Arriaza, supra note 26, at 158 (“If reparations are so universally accepted as part of a 
state’s human rights obligations, why have so few states emerging from periods of con-
flict or mass atrocity put viable programs into place?”). 
 34. See Michael Reisman & Janet Koven Levit, Reflections on the Problem of Indi-
vidual Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, in THE MODERN WORLD OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THOMAS BUERGENTHAL 419, 420–23 (Antonio A. Cançado 
Trindade ed., 1996). However, this says nothing about the potential positive implications 
of such a principle ripening into customary international law. See The Paquete Habana, 
175 U.S. 677, 708 (1900) (relying on the customs and usages of civilized nations in con-
cluding that “it is an established rule of international law . . . that coast fishing vessels . . . 
are exempt from capture as prize of war”). 
 35. Reisman & Levit, supra note 34, at 421. Reisman and Levit address a further 
indignity that victims must suffer as a result of the “normative gray gap” between the 
international human rights framework and national law: 
[V]ictims of [gross and systematic human rights] violations actually suffer 
twice: first, in being the victims and second, in their obligation to participate, 
with all other citizens, in paying compensation . . . . When we say that the state 
is responsible and must compensate, we are really saying that the citizens of the 
State, including the victims, must pay to compensate for [human rights] viola-
tions. 
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emerging trend of enforcement for grave violations of international law, 
which represents a positive development for human rights and the rule of 
law.36 Second, the implementation of a “comprehensive and coherent 
reparations program”37 in Bahrain is ultimately in the best legal, moral, 
and political interests of the al-Khalifa regime and two of its closest 
allies, Saudi Arabia38 and the United States.39 
This Note is divided into three main sections. Part I discusses Ba-
hrain’s history of human rights abuses and major advances and setbacks 
in the nation’s ongoing transitional justice or “national reconciliation” 
process. Part II discusses the effectiveness of the existing international 
legal framework in guaranteeing victims of massive and systematic hu-
man rights abuses the right to a remedy and reparations. Part III explores 
what an administrative reparations scheme for Bahraini victims might 
look like in light of progress made.40 It draws upon lessons learned from 
the Moroccan transitional justice experience, the first of its kind in the 
Middle East,41 and introduces some key political issues involved in fi-
nancing any such reparations program. The Note concludes by examin-
                                                                                                             
Id. See also REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 8 (“Given the absence 
of a regional human rights mechanism in the Middle East, the United Nations is the main 
body monitoring Bahrain’s compliance with its human rights obligations.”). 
 36. See Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 203 (outlining a wide movement towards the rec-
ognition of the rights of victims of crime, whether domestic or international, or gross 
violations of human rights); Reisman & Levit, supra note 34, at 419, 436 (discussing the 
crystallization of an international norm that now explicitly includes human rights viola-
tions among the international crimes for which individuals bear responsibility); Roht-
Arriaza, supra note 26, at 157, 163. 
 37. See De Greiff, supra note 23, at 452, 467–71. 
 38. Navigating Nebulous Waters: Prospects for Transitional Justice in Bahrain 5 
(Aug. 1, 2007) (unpublished working paper, on file with the International Center for 
Transitional Justice, Middle East North Africa Unit) [hereinafter Prospects for Transi-
tional Justice in Bahrain] (“At present, Saudi Arabia arguably wields more influence 
over Bahrain than any other country, both politically and economically. Moreover, as the 
political and spiritual center of Sunni Islam, Saudi Arabia has a vested interest in support-
ing the rule of the Sunni al-Khalifa against Iranian influence and any potential Shia upris-
ing.”). 
 39. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 95-1013, supra note 15, at 3. See also C.I.A. 
World Factbook: Bahrain, supra note 8 (Bahrain is neighbor to the primary Middle East-
ern petroleum sources and occupies a strategic location in the Persian Gulf through which 
much of the Western world’s petroleum must transit to reach open ocean). 
 40. See generally THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 1; Prospects for 
Transitional Justice in Bahrain, supra note 38, at 8–10, 27–31 (discussing the internal 
power dynamics of the regime, and relevant reforms and recent developments).  
 41. See generally International Center for Transitional Justice, Morocco, http://www. 
ictj.org/en/where/region5/591.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2007) [hereinafter ICTJ Moroc-
co Overview]. 
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ing the likely implications of Bahrain’s current, limited course of action 
and what other nations seeking to confront similarly repressive pasts can 
learn from the Bahraini experience. 
I. SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES AND THE BEGINNINGS OF 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BAHRAIN 
As a member of the international community of States, Bahrain is ob-
ligated to prevent the practice of torture within its sovereign territory and 
to remedy any such violations once they have occurred.42 The Draft Ar-
ticles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts establish 
that a State commits an internationally wrongful act when (1) conduct 
consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State under in-
ternational law; and (2) such conduct constitutes a breach of an interna-
tional obligation of the State.43 There is thus widespread consensus that a 
State bears an international legal obligation to provide reparations where 
state agents are responsible for the violative act.44 In fact, even in in-
stances where the State’s direct involvement cannot be proven, the State 
is still responsible if it was complicit in the violations or failed to exer-
cise due diligence in investigating or prosecuting the violations.45 
The prohibition against torture is widely understood to have achieved 
jus cogens status.46 Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture and Oth-
                                                                                                             
 42. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER 
CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 1 (1988) (“[T]he Conven-
tion is based upon recognition that [the prohibition against torture and other cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment] is already established under international 
law.”); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 5, 8, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
 43. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. 
Res. 56/83, art. 2, UN Doc. A/Res/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002). 
 44. E.g., Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 157, 163. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 332, 344 (defining a jus cogens norm, or a “peremptory norm of general inter-
national law,” as “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same charac-
ter”). See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 714, 717 (9th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied 507 U.S. 1017 (1993) (quoting the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties’ definition of jus cogens and stating that the prohibition against torture has “the 
force of a jus cogens norm”); Al-Adsani v United Kingdom, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11, 30 (re-
cognizing the prohibition of torture as a rule of jus cogens); BETH VAN SCHAACK & 
RONALD C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 496 (2007). 
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er Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) de-
fines torture as 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, 
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining 
from him or a third person information or confession, punishing him 
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any 
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffer-
ing is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquies-
cence of a public official or other person acting in an official capaci-
ty.47 
Even though Bahrain did not accede to CAT until March 6, 1998,48 and 
the provisions of the treaty cannot be applied ex post facto, the State still 
breached its obligation to prevent torture under customary international 
law.49 Ironically, Article 19 of the 1973 Bahraini Constitution explicitly 
proscribed physical and mental torture and the use of confessions ob-
tained under torture or degrading treatment.50 Since ratifying CAT, Ba-
hrain has the affirmative obligation to prevent torture by “tak[ing] effec-
tive legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts 
of torture under its jurisdiction.”51 This requires States Parties to crimi-
nalize the act of torture and complicity or participation in torture.52 
In 1973, only two years after Bahrain achieved its independence, Amir 
‘Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa issued a decree officially making Bahrain an 
                                                                                                             
 47. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 
[hereinafter CAT]. There are 146 State Parties to CAT. United Nations Treaty Collection, 
Convention Against Torture, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY 
&id=129&chapter=4&lang=en [hereinafter UNTC CAT] (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). See 
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. 
Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. There are 164 State Parties to the 
ICCPR. United Nations Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&id=322&chapter=4 
&lang=en [hereinafter UNTC ICCPR] (last visited Feb. 27, 2009); U.N. Human Rights 
Comm., General Comment No. 20, Replaces General Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition 
of Torture and Cruel Treatment of Punishment (Article 7), para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/47/40 
(1992). 
 48. UNTC CAT, supra note 47. 
 49. See Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, para. 111 
(July 21, 2000) (concluding that Article 1 of CAT “reflects customary international 
law”); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 42, at 1. 
 50. BAHR. CONST. of 1973, art. 19(d). The prohibition is replicated in Article 19(d) of 
the 2002 Amended Constitution. BAHR. CONST. of 2002, art. 19(d)  
 51. CAT, supra note 47, art. 2(1). 
 52. Id. art. 4(1). 
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Islamic State in which Islamic law, or sharia, is the main source of legis-
lation.53 Initial optimism within Bahraini civil society following the 
enactment of the new constitutional regime quickly dissipated after the 
issuance of the State Security Law of 1974.54 The law provided the legal 
pretext for many of the human rights abuses perpetrated during the next 
two decades by empowering security forces to arrest and detain for up to 
three years any person who allegedly “perpetrated acts, delivered state-
ments, exercised activities or [was] involved in contacts inside or outside 
the country, which are of a nature considered to be in violation of the 
internal or external security of the country.”55 
Following the Amir’s decision in 1976 to dissolve the National As-
sembly—Bahrain’s parliament—the government relied on the State Se-
curity Law and a policy of forced exile to silence opposition.56 The re-
pression intensified following the 1978–1979 Islamic Revolution in 
Iran.57 The Revolution emboldened Bahrain’s Shiite majority to chal-
lenge the status quo rule of the Sunni elite.58 Fearing Iranian support for 
opposition groups and the possibility of a coup, the Bahraini Government 
cracked down.59 State security forces detained dozens of Shiite leaders 
on allegations of plotting to overthrow the royal family.60 Detainees were 
allegedly tortured and held incommunicado for months before they were 
all found guilty by the State Security Court in 1982.61 Sentences ranged 
from seven years to life in prison.62 
Torture was most prevalent in Bahrain during the mid-1990s at the 
height of the popular uprising that called for democratic reform and a 
return to a constitutional system of governance.63 The report by the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Torture to the Human Rights Commission in 1997 
describes the prevailing approach towards the practice during this epoch: 
[M]ost persons arrested for political reasons in Bahrain were held in-
communicado, a condition of detention conducive to torture. The Secu-
rity and Intelligence Service . . . and the Criminal Investigation De-
partment . . . were alleged frequently to conduct interrogation of such 
                                                                                                             
 53. BAHR. CONST. of 1973, art. 2. 
 54. HRW, ROUTINE ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL, supra note 5, at 11. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 12. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 11–12. 
 61. Id. at 12. 
 62. Id. 
 63. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
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detainees under torture . . . said to be undertaken with impunity, with 
no known cases of officials having been prosecuted for acts of torture 
or other ill-treatment . . . . 
In addition to its use as a means to extract a ‘confession,’ torture was 
also reportedly administered to force detainees to sign statements 
pledging to renounce their political affiliation, to desist from future an-
ti-government activity, to coerce the victim into reporting on the activi-
ties of others, to inflict punishment and to instill fear in political oppo-
nents. The methods of torture reported include: falaqa (beatings on the 
soles of the feet); severe beatings, sometimes with hose-pipes; suspen-
sion of the limbs in contorted positions accompanied by blows to the 
body; enforced prolonged standing; sleep deprivation; preventing vic-
tims from relieving themselves; immersion in water to the point of near 
drowning; burnings with cigarettes; piercing the skin with a drill; sex-
ual assault, including the insertion of objects into the penis or anus; 
threats of execution or of harm to family members; and placing detai-
nees suffering from sickle cell anemia (said to be prevalent in the coun-
try) in air-conditioned rooms in the winter, which can lead to injury to 
internal organs.64 
Ian Henderson, a citizen of the United Kingdom and the head of the 
State Intelligence Service from 1966 to 1998, is widely believed to be 
responsible for the routine use of torture during his tenure.65 Although 
Henderson himself admits that “vigorous interrogation” techniques were 
used, he categorically denies engaging in torture or ordering his forces to 
do so.66 
In 1999, Amir Sheikh ‘Isa bin Salman al-Khalifa died and was suc-
ceeded by his son, Sheikh Hamad bin ‘Isa al-Khalifa. Recognizing that 
social peace was essential to securing foreign investment—the royal 
family’s major source of income—and its political survival, Sheikh Ha-
mad launched a series of reforms.67 
                                                                                                             
 64. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel S. 
Rodley, Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/37 B, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/7 (Jan. 10, 1997). 
 65. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 9; Human Rights Watch, 
U.K. Should Open Files on Bahrain Torture: Role of U.K. National Seen as Pivotal, Jan. 
10, 2000, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2000/01/10/uk-should-open-files-bahrain-torture. 
Other individuals alleged to have committed, or overseen, torture include Adel Flaifel, 
Khalid al-Wazzan, Abdulaziz Ateyatallah al-Khalifa, and Alistair Bain McNutt. HRW, 
ROUTINE ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL, supra note 5, at 23. 
 66. Neil Mackay, Scots Security Boss Branded “Master Torturer” of Bahrain, BIG 
ISSUE (SCOTLAND), Jan. 8, 1997. 
 67. Prospects for Transitional Justice in Bahrain, supra note 38, at 18. 
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Prior to the adoption of a new constitution in February 2002, King 
Hamad issued two legislative decrees central to any discussion about 
justice and reparations for governmental abuses in Bahrain.68 Legislative 
Decree No. 10 of 2001 established a “general amnesty . . . for crimes 
affecting national security . . . committed by citizens before the enact-
ment of this Law.”69 The Decree led to the release of all political detai-
nees, both pretrial and posttrial, and hundreds of people forcibly exiled 
were allowed to return.70 
The initial positive effects of the amnesty were quickly overshadowed 
by Legislative Decree No. 56 of 2002, which clarifies the scope of Legis-
lative Decree No. 10 and effectively grants immunity to security officers 
and state officials from prosecution for human rights abuses perpetrated 
prior to 2001.71 The key provision stipulates that no cases arising under 
Legislative Decree No. 10 shall be heard by any “judicial authority,” re-
gardless of “the person filing it and irrespective of the capacity against 
whom it is filed, whether he is an ordinary citizen or a civilian or military 
public servant.”72 
II. THE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
LAW 
Natural justice has long recognized that harms should be remedied.73 In 
fact, some form of the right to redress can be found in “every organised 
society.”74 The right to a remedy for victims of violations of international 
                                                                                                             
 68. Legislative Decree No. 10 of 2001 with Respect to General Amnesty for Crimes 
Affecting National Security; Legislative Decree No. 56 of 2002 with Respect to Interpret-
ing Certain Provisions of` Legislative Decree No. 10 of 2001 with Respect to General 
Amnesty for Crimes Affecting National Security [hereinafter Legislative Decree No. 56]. 
 69. Id. The sole exception is in cases of crimes resulting in death. Id. art. 2. 
 70. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the Ques-
tion of Torture and Detention: Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention: 
Visit to Bahrain 10, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/77/Add.2 (Mar. 5, 2002). 
 71. Legislative Decree No. 56, supra note 68; Comm. Against Torture, Consideration 
of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/CR/34/BHR (June 21, 2005) [hereinafter CAT Comm. 2] (Expressing concern at 
the “blanket amnesty extended to all perpetrators of torture or other crimes by Decree No. 
56 of 2002 and the lack of redress available to victims of torture”); REDRESS, 
REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 14. 
 72. Legislative Decree No. 56, supra note 68, art. 1, para. 2. 
 73. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 207; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 157. 
 74. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 207. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 
(1803) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individu-
al to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first 
duties of government is to afford that protection.”). 
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human rights law is set forth in numerous international instruments.75 
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) ex-
tends the right to an “effective remedy” by the appropriate national tri-
bunal for any violations of a person’s fundamental rights as protected by 
the constitution or by law.76 Article 2 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) recognizes a “right to an effective 
remedy.”77 Article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) obligates States Par-
ties to assure “effective protection and remedies” and access to “just and 
adequate reparation or satisfaction” for violations of the rights contained 
therein.78 Lastly, Article 14 of CAT mandates a State Party to “ensure in 
its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has 
an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the 
means for as full rehabilitation as possible.”79 
The Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) in the Chorzow 
Factory (Jurisdiction) Case decisively articulated the legal duty to com-
pensate for a recognized harm.80 For its part, the International Court of 
                                                                                                             
 75. 2006 Basic Principles, supra note 2, pmbl. In addition to human rights law, the 
right to a remedy is implicitly recognized in the context of international humanitarian 
law, including in (1) the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War; (2) the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War; and (3) Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Convention. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 
213–14. 
 76. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 42, art. 8. 
 77. ICCPR, supra note 47, art. 2. See also id. art. 9. Bahrain acceded to the ICCPR in 
2006. UNTC ICCPR, supra note 47. 
 78. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, G.A. Res. 2106 A (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195. Bahrain acceded to 
the ICERD in 1990. United Nations Treaty Collection, International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/View 
Details.aspx?src=TREATY&id=319&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 27, 2009). 
 79. CAT, supra note 47, art. 14(1). The 2006 Basic Principles also ground the right in 
Article 3 of the Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 
18 October 1907 (Convention IV); Article 91 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Interna-
tional Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) of June 8, 1977; Article 39 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child; and Articles 68 and 75 of the Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court. 2006 Basic Principles, supra note 2, pmbl. For a discussion of the extensive 
U.N. efforts preceding the introduction of the 2006 Basic Principles, see SHELTON, supra 
note 6. 
 80. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, 1927 P.C.I.J. (Ser. A) No. 9, at 29 (“[I]t 
is a principle of international law . . . that any breach of engagement involves an obliga-
tion to make reparation.”). According to Richard Falk, the Advisory Opinion by the In-
ternational Court of Justice concerning the Israeli security wall reaffirmed the validity of 
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Justice (“ICJ”) applies the Chorzow approach of seeking to restore the 
situation to what “would have existed” had no breach occurred.81 Simi-
larly, current jurisprudence in both the Inter-American and European 
human rights systems is clear that the underlying principle behind repara-
tions is “full restitution” (restitutio in integrum) and the reestablishment 
of the status quo ante.82 While legally and normatively unequivocal, such 
reasoning illuminates the fundamental paradox inherent in any discussion 
of reparations: specifically, the fact that it is ultimately impossible to re-
store the victim of any grave violation of human rights to the status quo 
ante.83 
National courts are supposed to serve as the gateway for victims seek-
ing reparations for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian 
law.84 In fact, an individual lacks standing to even bring a claim before 
most international bodies until he or she has exhausted available domes-
tic remedies.85 Ideally, national courts should operate in conjunction with 
international criminal tribunals and treaty obligations as part of a “flexi-
ble strategy” to enforce an “international consensus” against impunity for 
those who commit international crimes.86 
However, experience has repeatedly proven the ineffectiveness of rely-
ing on national courts for such a purpose because the courts are “almost 
always. . . inoperative” during the conflict periods in which massive and 
systematic human right violations usually occur, and because “it takes 
quite some time for courts to assume an independent stance capable of 
                                                                                                             
this legal obligation in its finding that Israel has owed a duty to provide reparations to 
Palestinians harmed by the building of the illegal wall on their territory. Falk, supra note 
1, at 482–83. 
 81. SHELTON, supra note 6, at 92. But see Christian Tomuschat, Reparations for Vic-
tims of Grave Human Rights Violations, 10 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 157, 166 (arguing 
that neither the PJIC nor the ICJ “has ever said that states are under an obligation to com-
pensate their own citizens in cases where they have suffered harm at the hands of public 
authorities”). 
 82. De Greiff, supra note 23, at 455. See, e.g., Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, 
Judgment of July 29, 1988, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 174 (1988) (“The 
State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to 
use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed 
within its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment 
and to ensure the victim adequate compensation.”). 
 83. Roht-Arriaza, supra at 26, at 157–58 (“What could replace lost health and sereni-
ty; the loss of a loved one or of a whole extended family; a whole generation of friends; 
the destruction of home and culture and community and peace?”). 
 84. Id. at 165. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2001 I.C.J. 63, 
78 (Feb. 14) (Joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal). 
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finding powerful forces (usually the government itself) liable for viola-
tions.”87 In many cases, amnesty laws, relevant statutes of limitations, 
and procedural mechanisms block victims from pursuing civil claims or 
prohibit criminal prosecution.88 
As a result, many victims of grave human rights violations have had 
more success pursuing their claims in foreign courts.89 Particularly in the 
wake of World War II, several countries have “statutorily institutiona-
lized” the principle of universal jurisdiction to hold perpetrators of grave 
human rights violations accountable.90 The universality principle recog-
nizes that certain crimes are so reprehensible that they harm all people, 
and therefore any nation may act on behalf of the international communi-
ty to prosecute and punish those responsible, regardless of where the 
crimes were committed.91 A national court may thus exercise universal 
jurisdiction only over those crimes regarded as serious violations of in-
                                                                                                             
 87. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 165. 
 88. Id. The failure by States to ensure victims their right to reparation is particularly 
problematic where the substantive breach violated a jus cogens norm under customary 
international law, such as the prohibition against torture. Thus, while States may argue 
that the right to reparation for victims of torture is a secondary right that is derogable, at 
least one commentator has rejected such reasoning as untenable because it enables States 
to “in fact derogate from a peremptory norm by breaching it and not enforcing the respec-
tive consequences[,] an outcome [that] is conceptually incompatible with the very con-
cept of jus cogens.” Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms and Reparation for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, 3 BALTIC Y.B. INT’L L. 19, 28 (2003). 
 89. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 166. 
 90. Reisman & Levit, supra note 34, at 434. For a comprehensive survey of state 
practice at the national level in approximately 120 countries relevant to universal jurisdic-
tion prosecutions, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION—THE DUTY 
OF STATES TO ENACT AND ENFORCE LEGISLATION (Sept. 2001). See also HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN EUROPE: THE STATE OF THE ART (June 2006).    
 91. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 1, 2002, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 
(1994); Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993); Agreement 
for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. See 
also Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (“A state may exercise 
jurisdiction to define and punish certain offenses recognized by the community of nations 
as of universal concern.”); Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (“In 
the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the 
nations of the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their 
individual and collective interest.”); Regina v. Bow St. Magistrates, Ex p. Pinochet 
Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 198 (“The jus cogens nature of the international crime 
of torture justifies states in taking universal jurisdiction over torture wherever commit-
ted.”). 
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ternational law.92 Offenses rising to this level include war crimes, geno-
cide, hostage taking, and torture.93 
Perhaps the most effective mechanism to date has been through civil 
claims under the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), also referred to 
as the Alien Tort Statute.94 The ATCA provides that “the district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the Unit-
ed States.”95 Foreign nationals may thus seek relief for harm they have 
suffered “in violation of the law of nations” or a treaty to which the Unit-
ed States is a party.96 States are immune to suit under ATCA, however, 
and therefore plaintiffs may only bring suit against violators “in their 
individual capacity.”97 Beginning with the seminal Filártiga v. Peña-
Irala decision in 1980, foreign nationals have won numerous multimil-
lion dollar judgments or verdicts against individual perpetrators includ-
ing torturers, ex-generals, heads of state, and war criminals.98 However, 
U.S. courts may only exercise jurisdiction over a defendant where the 
court possesses in personam jurisdiction, and thus the defendant must be 
                                                                                                             
 92. See Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 1 A.C. at 148, 198. See also Arrest Warrant of 
11 April 2000, 2001 I.C.J. at 81 (finding universal jurisdiction appropriate for “those 
crimes regarded as the most heinous by the international community”). 
 93. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2001 I.C.J. at 78. 
 94. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 157, 166. 
 95. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2009). In 1992, President George H.W. 
Bush signed into law the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (“TVPA”). The TVPA 
reinforces the ATCA by authorizing both U.S. and non-U.S. victims of torture and extra-
judicial killing to bring a cause of action in the federal courts against those responsible. 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2009); Human Rights First, 
The Alien Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act: Important Tools in the Fight 
Against Impunity, http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/international_justice/w_context/w_ 
cont_12.htm (last visited Dec. 16, 2007).        
 96. Human Rights First, supra note 98 (“U.S. courts have interpreted violations of the 
‘law of nations’ under the ATCA to include crimes against humanity, war crimes, geno-
cide, torture, rape, and summary execution.”). 
 97. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 235. 
 98. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 167 (noting that while large judgments under the 
ATCA are generally uncollectible, they serve other purposes such as “allow[ing] victims 
to publicly tell their stories, publiciz[ing] the violations at issue[,] . . . official[ly] recog-
ni[zing] that the plaintiffs were wronged,” deterring perpetrators from traveling to certain 
countries or assuming high-ranking government positions, and catalyzing domestic action 
to address the violation); Human Rights First, supra note 99 (“[The] ATCA has been 
used effectively on behalf of victims of gross human rights abuses perpetrated by well-
known political and military figures—such as Ferdinand Marcos, Radovan Karadzic, and 
two Salvadoran generals—as well as by lesser-known government officials in different 
parts of the world.”). 
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physically present in the United States.99 Given this jurisdictional re-
quirement, it seems unlikely—though not impossible—that Bahraini tor-
ture victims will have an opportunity to pursue claims under the ATCA. 
Reparations in the context of transition from a period of authoritarian-
ism to one of relative democracy is still a new concept within the field of 
international law. Thus, if international law is largely understood to “co-
dif[y] behavioral trends in state practice and shifting political attitudes on 
the part of governments with the intention of stabilizing and clarifying 
expectations about the future,” then the fact that the current system re-
mains largely ineffective in holding Member States responsible for deny-
ing victims of massive rights violations their right to reparations is more 
easily understood.100 Nevertheless, as long as “trends of national prac-
tice” in similar circumstances and “wider global trends toward individual 
accountability for crimes against humanity” remain entirely subservient 
to “domestic discretion” (and inaction), the right to reparation will con-
tinue to carry little practical significance for victims.101 If this is the case, 
then perhaps Richard Falk will remain justified in “view[ing] reparations 
as primarily an expression of moral and political forces at work in differ-
ent contexts.”102 
III. THE CURRENT BAHRAINI APPROACH 
A. Bahrain’s Limited Progress 
At present, the case of Bahrain serves as an example of a country 
whose “new” leadership is willing to renounce its oppressive past with-
out taking conclusive action to address it.103 While Bahrain has taken 
                                                                                                             
 99. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[D]eliberate torture 
perpetrated under the color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the 
international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties. Thus, 
whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within [U.S.] 
borders, [the ATCA] provides federal jurisdiction.”). See also Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 
234. 
 100. Falk, supra note 1, at 480. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 485. 
 103. Id. at 495. The phrase “new leadership” is used loosely here, as many government 
officials from the preceding era of repression remain in positions of power despite the 
passing of the Amir and his son Hamad’s succession to power. The long-standing posi-
tion of the Prime Minister, the Amir’s brother and the most powerful man in Bahrain 
according to many accounts, is telling in this regard. The Prime Minister is generally 
considered to be opposed to any “dramatic” reform. A power struggle has thus emerged 
between the Prime Minister and the King’s son, Crown Prince Salman, who is head of the 
Economic Development Board and more reform minded. The King has seemingly re-
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measures over the last decade to comply with its various treaty obliga-
tions, the government continues to obfuscate its unwillingness to ensure 
that victims of torture have access to redress or other compensation.104 
Bahrain’s civil code specifies that “[e]very unlawful act that has caused 
damage to others makes an obligation upon the person who committed it 
to pay compensation.”105 However, the law also shields public officials 
from liability where they were acting in an official capacity or based 
upon superior orders.106 Torture is also prohibited under multiple provi-
sions of the penal code.107 Official statements praising the national re-
conciliation process stand in stark contrast to the government’s “failure 
to investigate promptly, impartially, and fully the numerous allegations 
of torture and ill-treatment and to prosecute alleged offenders,” and its 
refusal to provide “complete and disaggregated information about the 
number of detainees who have suffered torture or ill-treatment, including 
any deaths in custody, the results of investigations into the causes, and 
whether any officials were found responsible.”108 
Furthermore, the al-Khalifa regime seemingly remains averse towards 
viewing the situation as one of massive human rights violations, the 
scope of which might necessitate the use of nontraditional judicial me-
chanisms, such as a government-administered reparations program.109 
Rather, the regime has suggested that victims of torture or ill-treatment 
have failed to exhaust access to redress through the Bahraini legal sys-
                                                                                                             
mained above the fray thus far, though he has sided with his son on certain issues. CRS 
REPORT FOR CONGRESS 95-1013, supra note 15, at 1; Prospects for Transitional Justice in 
Bahrain, supra note 38, at 9–10. See also CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7, at 21. 
 104. Human Rights Watch, Bahrain: Events of 2006, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/ 
docs/2007/01/11/bahrai14699.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2007). On September 2, 2007, 
Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa cautioned that “democracy, open-
ness and freedom of opinion should not be used as a pretext to violate the law, sow secta-
rian sedition, or falsify truths in international arenas, claiming internal liberties are 
curbed.” Invoking a popular government refrain, the Prime Minister explained that 
“[p]latforms for expressing opinions are open ‘to accommodate all stances and trends as 
long as they serve the national interests rather than personal designs’ . . . . He also warned 
against what one Bahraini newspaper termed ‘misusing the parliament to raise controver-
sial issues.’” Id. 
 105. Decree Law No. 19/2001, art. 158. 
 106. Id. art. 169. 
 107. REDRESS, REPARATIONS FOR TORTURE, supra note 5, at 10. 
 108. CAT Comm. 2, supra note 71, paras. 6–7. Other subjects of concern included the 
“large number of allegations of torture . . . committed prior to 2001,” the blanket amnesty 
extended to all alleged perpetrators of torture or other crimes by Decree No. 56 of 2002, 
the lack of redress available to victims of torture, and the inadequate availability in prac-
tice of civil compensation and rehabilitation for victims of torture prior to 2001. Id. 
 109. See Id. 
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tem.110 In reality, amnesty legislation has blocked attempts by torture 
victims to bring claims.111 While the sheer magnitude of abuses in Ba-
hrain does not reach levels witnessed in postconflict States such as Ger-
many, Argentina, or Peru, the numbers are such that even an earnest at-
tempt to address all of the cases through the national legal system would 
inherently challenge certain bedrock norms—in particular, the premise 
that “norm-breaking behavior is more or less exceptional.”112 
Temporarily setting aside the fact that there is no evidence of victims 
receiving access to justice through the Bahraini civil system and no 
known instances of the State prosecuting perpetrators, a case-by-case 
approach raises other issues as well.113 According to De Greiff, the two 
biggest problems are that it serves to “disaggregate” both victims and the 
reparations process as a whole.114 Historically, victims do not all receive 
equal access to the courts, and disparities in damage awards inherently 
create a “hierarchy” of victims.115 Moreover, an individualized approach 
poses challenges from a publicity standpoint. Decisions pertaining to the 
disclosure of case-specific facts may make it difficult to provide consis-
tent publication of information about awards.116 The task of effectively 
conveying to the public the “nature and magnitude” of reparations meas-
ures is compounded by this disaggregation.117 Finally, there is also the 
                                                                                                             
 110. CAT Comm. 1, supra note 19, para. 34. The Bahraini delegation before the 
Committee Against torture stated:  
Nobody had filed a claim for civil compensation based on allegations of torture 
and nobody had brought a claim before the Constitutional Court alleging that 
Decree No. 56 of 2002 was unconstitutional. That proved the unsound nature 
and lack of credibility of claims for compensation that failed to exhaust domes-
tic remedies. In effect, such claims merely damaged the interests of those who 
had suffered human rights violations.  
Id.  
 111. Presentation by Carla Ferstman, Director of Redress, Accountability for Human 
Rights Violations in Bahrain, Aug. 23, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.redress.org/ 
reports/Presentation%20on%20Bahrain%2023%20Aug%2006%20_final_.pdf (noting that 
“a number of claims have indeed been filed” and blocked). 
 112. De Greiff, supra note 23, at 454. 
 113. CAT Comm. 2, supra note 71, para. 6 (expressing concern at the “apparent failure 
to prosecute alleged offenders, and in particular the pattern of impunity for torture and 
other ill-treatment committed by law enforcement personnel in the past”); Presentation by 
Carla Ferstman, supra note 111, at 2 (addressing the inability of torture victims to bring 
claims as a result of the amnesty legislation). 
 114. De Greiff, supra note 23, at 458. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
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risk that the completion of legal proceedings may not be coordinated 
with other reparative efforts that may play an equally important role in 
providing full restitution to victims.118 
B. Financing Massive Reparations and Questions of Political Economy 
Transitional societies seeking to finance administrative reparations 
programs while consolidating democratic reforms typically face chal-
lenges resulting from the “political dimensions” of such an undertaking, 
and the omnipresent “scarcity of resources” dilemma.119 While Bahrain is 
certain to encounter a host of political, economic, and social obstacles in 
financing a massive reparations program, the country’s power structure 
and the conditions underlying its transition do present certain opportuni-
ties. Prominent among these is that, while the 1990s in Bahrain can aptly 
be characterized as a time of domestic upheaval and state repression, 
such circumstances differ considerably from those in a society simulta-
neously transitioning from war to peace, such as the case in El Salvador 
or Guatemala.120 
As a “relatively well-off” country with “a limited and easily identifia-
ble set of victims,” Bahrain also fits the more traditional profile for gov-
ernments that have implemented administrative reparations programs to 
address massive human rights violations.121 Noteworthy in this regard is 
that, similar to the experiences of nations such as Argentina and Chile, 
governmental abuses in Bahrain were committed “against a largely un-
armed opposition,” absent conditions of armed conflict.122 
                                                                                                             
 118. Id. 
 119. Alexander Segovia, Financing Reparations Programs: Reflections from Interna-
tional Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 1, at 650, 652–53. The 
“political dimension” encompasses the negotiations among key stakeholders necessary to 
mobilize and allocate financial resources. Id. at 653. 
 120. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 174–75; Segovia, supra note 122, at 653. 
 121. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 169. According to the U.N. Development Pro-
gramme’s 2008 Human Development Index (“HDI”) Rankings, Bahrain ranks 32nd out 
of 179 countries, making it a “high human development” country ahead of most of its 
Gulf neighbors and most developing countries. U.N. Development Programme’s 2008 
Human Development Index Rankings, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ (last visited Feb. 
16, 2009). The HDI provides a composite measure of three dimensions of human devel-
opment: living a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy), being educated 
(measured by adult literacy and enrollment at the primary, secondary, and tertiary level), 
and having a decent standard of living (measured by purchasing power parity income). 
 122. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 169. 
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Although Bahrain enjoys relative economic prosperity,123 any program 
of reparations will require the government to reallocate its current spend-
ing priorities and/or seek additional financial support.124 This is likely to 
remain a major political challenge without any significant changes to 
Bahrain’s internal power dynamics125 and in light of difficulties to date 
establishing consensus amongst national parties on the scope of any po-
tential compensation payments by the government.126 However, the re-
cent implementation of a controversial one percent income tax on all 
public and private sector employees to help fund a national unemploy-
ment insurance plan indicates that the government has the ability to mo-
bilize the necessary resources where the political will exists.127 Ultimate-
ly, any progress on this front will require “the support of the Crown 
Prince and those loyal to him as this block was instrumental in advancing 
the key reforms of 2000, and national reconciliation is a critical precon-
dition to the Crown Prince’s larger political agenda of modernizing Ba-
hrain.”128 
Reparations, by their very nature, require the State to acknowledge its 
wrongful conduct by recognizing and compensating the victims.129 The 
Bahraini government has proved tremendously reluctant to acknowledge 
and accept responsibility.130 Instead, it has offered only blanket condem-
nation131 for the “situation” combined with limited progress.132 Such re-
                                                                                                             
 123. C.I.A. World Factbook: Bahrain, supra note 8. “Facing declining oil reserves, 
Bahrain has turned to petroleum processing and refining and has transformed itself into 
an international banking center.” In 2007, Bahrain had an estimated real growth rate 
(GDP) of 6.7%. Id. 
 124. Segovia, supra note 119, at 655. 
 125. See supra note 103. 
 126. MPs Deadlocked over Riots Relief, GULF DAILY NEWS, Apr. 11, 2007. Members 
of parliament were unable to reach agreement on a proposal to compensate victims of 
political unrest during the 1990s. Potential beneficiaries discussed included victims of 
abuse as well as property owners who suffered damages. Id. 
 127. Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace Arab Reform Bulletin: July/Aug. 2007, Ba-
hrain: First Gulf Income Tax; Press Law; Truth and Reconciliation Committee, 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb/?fa=showIssue&backIssue=7/1/2007 (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2009). The income tax is the first of its kind for an Arab Gulf State. Under the 
law, both citizens and noncitizens are required to contribute, though only citizens will 
receive benefits. Id. 
 128. Prospects for Transitional Justice in Bahrain, supra note 38, at 39. 
 129. Segovia, supra note 119, at 655. 
 130. See CAT Comm. 2, supra note 71. 
 131. See, e.g., CAT Bahrain Comments, supra note 20, para. A(3) (The national re-
conciliation process “put an end to internal strife and brought the country out of the polit-
ical and social crisis which had beset it, closing a chapter on the past and helping to 
create a climate conducive to the enjoyment of public freedoms.”). 
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luctance is undoubtedly tied to the fact that “programs of reparation are 
part of a more general human rights agenda, which involves the defense 
of traditionally marginalized social groups.”133 Sectarian tension in Ba-
hrain continues to simmer because the ruling Sunni elite have systemati-
cally marginalized Bahrain’s Shiite majority.134 Therefore, any program 
of reparations in Bahrain is inextricably tied to the access and exercise of 
power.135 This connection helps to explain the reticence exhibited by the 
Bahraini elite in earnestly addressing the past—particularly the Prime 
Minister—and why the ruling regime has taken only carefully calculated 
measures designed to ease pressure without producing any fundamental 
changes to the Bahraini power structure and its hold on power.136 
Hypothetically speaking, would nations with a strong interest in the 
stability of Bahrain—such as the United States or Saudi Arabia—ever 
contribute financially to a program of reparations in Bahrain?137 Histori-
cally, foreign governments have made only limited financial contribu-
tions in support of such programs.138 One explanation for this trend is 
that foreign States view financing reparations as a responsibility belong-
ing to the State in transition.139 Another explanation is that given the po-
litical nature of reparations programs, foreign governments are hesitant 
to get involved in a situation that could result in conflict with a govern-
                                                                                                             
 132. On November 11, 2007, the cabinet announced the creation of a National Human 
Rights Authority. The body will be responsible for setting relevant policies, addressing 
human rights violations, and communicating with international organizations and nongo-
vernmental organizations. Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol. 5, Issue 9: Nov. 2007, Bahrain: 
Human Rights Authority; Journalists on Trial; Marriage Age Set, Carnegie Endowment 
for Int’l Peace, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id= 
19783&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl,zme. 
 133. Segovia, supra note 119, at 655. 
 134. See ICG REPORT, supra note 8. According to a 2006 assessment by the Econo-
mist, while Bahrain has a per capita income of close to $20,000, a third of the native Ba-
hraini workforce earns less than $600 a month—suggesting a significant disparity in the 
distribution of wealth within the country’s native population. Playing by Unfair Rules; 
Bahrain, ECONOMIST, Nov. 25, 2006. 
 135. See generally Segovia, supra note 119, at 655. 
 136. CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7, at 20. While promising, Bahrain’s political 
reforms are consistent with efforts ongoing in the other Gulf states, none of which “aim 
to fundamentally restructure power in any of these states.” Id. at summary. 
 137. This question does not imply that either the United States or Saudi Arabia bear 
any legal responsibility under international law for the practice of torture in Bahrain. This 
is an entirely different inquiry requiring analysis under the rules on state responsibility 
and the attribution of wrongful conduct to a State. Heidy Rombouts, Pietro Sardaro & 
Stef Vendeginste, in OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND 
SYSTEMATIC HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, supra note 6, at 345, 482. 
 138. Segovia, supra note 119, at 659. 
 139. Id. 
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ment or an influential sector of a country such as the military.140 It thus 
seems highly unlikely that the United States would be willing to contri-
bute to any such effort. Saudi Arabia is also unlikely to contribute finan-
cially, particularly given its own shameful human rights record141 and 
recent internal civil unrest.142 
C. The Moroccan Transitional Justice Experience 
A large-scale reparations program is not an unprecedented measure for 
a State in the Middle East and North Africa (“MENA”) region. Since 
1990, Morocco has implemented various transitional justice mechanisms 
in an effort to confront its repressive past, specifically the gross human 
rights abuses committed by the State in the decades following Moroccan 
independence in 1956.143 While Morocco’s experience is certainly 
unique and should not be understood as mapping directly to other MENA 
States, it offers critical insights about “both the promise and limits of 
truth-telling and reparations” and is beneficial to any discussion of transi-
tional justice in Bahrain.144 
                                                                                                             
 140. Id. 
 141. Human Rights Watch, Overview of Human Rights Developments: Saudi Arabia 
2006, http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/saudia14717.htm (last visited Dec. 
19, 2007) (“Overall human rights conditions remain poor in Saudi Arabia . . . . Saudi law 
does not protect many basic rights and the government places strict limits on freedom of 
association, assembly, and expression. Arbitrary detention, mistreatment and torture of 
detainees, restrictions on freedom of movement, and lack of official accountability re-
main serious concerns.”). 
 142. The U.S. war in Iraq and the corresponding empowerment of Iraqi Shiites and 
high levels of sectarian violence that resulted have produced “acute fears of potential 
Shiite unrest” in Saudi Arabia. CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7, at 5. 
 143. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41. Victims of government repression in-
cluded leftists, Islamists, Saharawi independence activists, unionists, military dissidents, 
intellectuals, and others considered to be threats to the State. INT’L CTR FOR TRANSITION-
AL JUSTICE, WORKSHOP ON THE GOALS AND CHALLENGES OF REPARATIONS AS A 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE MEASURE IN IRAQ 44 (2007) [hereinafter ICTJ WORKSHOP] (on file 
with the International Center for Transitional Justice, Middle East North Africa Unit). 
 144. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 44. For a discussion on the uniqueness of the 
Moroccan experience, see King Mohamed VI, The Speech of His Majesty the King Mo-
hamed VI Announcing the Formation of the Commission for Equity and Reconciliation 
(Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.ier.ma/article.php3?id_article=1297 (“Reflecting 
on the different international experiences in this particular field, one must acknowledge 
that Morocco, acting with wisdom and courage, has managed to come up with a model of 
its own.”). See also MOROCCAN EQUITY AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, SUMMARY OF THE 
FINDINGS OF THE FINAL REPORT 12 (Dec. 2005) (In examining “the issue of reparations 
through the experiences of truth commission that were formed across the world . . . the 
Commission concluded that there is no one model that can be adopted.”); An Interview 
with Hanny Megally, ALL AFRICA, Aug. 4, 2006 (“Each country has its own specificity as 
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Morocco’s initial transitional justice efforts began in 1990, under the 
late King Hassan II, who presided over the most intense era of repression 
commonly known as the “years of lead” and lasting from the 1960s until 
the early 1990s.145 To quell mounting criticism, the King established the 
Human Rights Advisory Council (Conseil Consultatif des Droits de 
l’Homme) (“CCDH”), and the government released hundreds of political 
dissidents throughout the early part of the decade while taking limited 
measures to reform its incommunicado detention policies.146 Despite 
making formal reservations to each, Morocco ratified CAT, the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 1993.147 
Similar to Bahrain, the death of King Hassan in 1999 and the succes-
sion to the throne of his more reform-minded son, Mohammed VI, pre-
sented a new opportunity to confront many of the unresolved issues tied 
to governmental abuses.148 King Mohammed VI ordered the formation of 
an independent Indemnity Commission (“IC”) within the CCDH in order 
to compensate Moroccans “‘who suffered moral or physical prejudice as 
a result of enforced disappearance or arbitrary detention.’”149 Over the 
course of four years, the IC decided more than 5000 cases and awarded a 
                                                                                                             
to how it will go about addressing a legacy of past abuses.”); Habib Toumi, Bahrain 
‘Must’ Have Its Own Justice System, GULF NEWS, Apr. 26, 2007 (quoting Joe Stork, Di-
rector of Human Rights Watch Middle East and North Africa Division, in discussing 
transitional justice generally in Bahrain: “[t]he process has to be home-grown because 
every country has its own realities and Bahrainis have to work together to build their 
own”). 
 145. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41. 
 146. Id. According to Human Rights Watch: “[i]n the late 1980’s Hassan II began 
releasing batches of political prisoners . . . . In 1991, Hassan II freed about 270 persons 
whom the security services had ‘disappeared’ as long as nineteen years earlier. In 1994, 
the King amnestied more than 400 political prisoners. Opposition figures returned to 
Morocco after years of exile . . . .” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MOROCCO’S TRUTH 
COMMISSION: HONORING PAST VICTIMS DURING AN UNCERTAIN PRESENT 6–7 (Nov. 2005) 
[hereinafter HRW MOROCCO]. 
 147. HRW MOROCCO, supra note 146, at 7. 
 148. Susan Slyomovics, No Buying off the Past: Moroccan Indemnities and the Oppo-
sition, 229 MIDDLE EAST REPORT 34 (Winter 2003). See generally Heidy Rombouts, Pie-
tro Sardaro & Stef Vendeginste, supra note 137, at 345, 481–82. “Regime succession” is 
a typical precursor to reparations for gross and systematic human rights violations, and it 
is a well established principle of international law that “neither a change of government 
nor a major regime change accompanied by a political transition and a constitutional 
reform of the state” disengages the State’s liability for human rights violations committed 
by a previous regime. Id. 
 149. Susan Slyomovics, A Truth Commission for Morocco, MIDDLE EAST REP. 218 
(Spring 2001). 
2009] REPARATIONS IN BAHRAIN 583 
total of approximately $100 million in reparations.150 However, the IC 
was criticized on “legal, moral and emotional” grounds.151 While the in-
demnity scheme acknowledged “implicitly, rather than explicitly, an 
official policy of illegal state practices,” compensation did little to meet 
the demands of victims seeking truth and justice, particularly those call-
ing for the punishment of perpetrators.152 Moreover, the IC was derided 
for its lack of transparency, for the complicity of its administrators in 
past governmental human rights violations, and for its limited mandate, 
which precluded the body from resolving thousands of cases.153 
In 2004, King Mohammed VI took another major step by establishing 
the Commission for Equity and Reconciliation (Instance Equité et 
Réconciliation) (“IER”).154 He declared the IER to be “equivalent to a 
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission.”155 The scope of the 
IER’s mandate was much broader than that of the IC, extending to “gross 
human rights violations that occurred between 1956 and the end of 
1999.”156 As a result, the IER had broad authority to assess, research, 
investigate, arbitrate, and make recommendations on claims not only for 
forced disappearance and arbitrary detention, but also for torture, sexual 
abuse, and deprivation of the right to life due to unrestrained use of state 
force and forced exile.157 The IER was also responsible for continuing 
                                                                                                             
 150. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41. 
 151. Slyomovics, supra note 148, at 35. 
 152. Id. As Houria Esslami, sister of political activist and doctor Mohamed Esslami 
who was “disappeared” in 1997, explained:  
[I]ndemnification should be the last stage of this dossier. In the first place, it is 
necessary to acknowledge all the disappeared, free those still living, speak the 
truth about the reasons for their disappearance and incriminate those responsi-
ble. It is only at that moment that one can speak about indemnification . . . . 
Id. 
 153. Id. The fact that the Commission did not have access to the extensive files of the 
security services and the Interior Ministry proved particularly damaging. ICTJ Morocco 
Overview, supra note 41. 
 154. Commission for Equity and Reconciliation, Mandate and Tasks, http://www.ier. 
ma/article.php3?id_article=1305 (last visited Dec. 19, 2007). The Commission’s mandate 
was from January 2004 to November 2005. The Commission was made up of a president 
and sixteen members, all appointed by the King upon recommendations by the CCDH. 
Nine of the members, including its president, were from the CCDH. Many of its members 
including its now-deceased president, Driss Benzekri, were former prisoners and torture 
survivors. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 47. 
 155. MOROCCAN EQUITY AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, supra note 144, at 1. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
584 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:2 
the work of the IC by compensating victims and their heirs.158 While the 
IER was only granted “non-judiciary powers” of investigation, “public 
authorities were obliged to cooperate because of [the Commission’s] 
royal support.”159 The IER was also prohibited from identifying individ-
ual perpetrators and could thus only identify institutions responsible for 
abuses.160 
During the course of its activities, the Commission considered more 
than 22,000 applications and held “victim-centered, public hearings” te-
levised throughout country.161 The IER released its final report in De-
cember 2005.162 The report details the responsibility of both State and 
nonstate actors for gross violations committed, and offers suggestions 
and recommendations for providing victims with the necessary “moral 
and medical rehabilitation and social reinsertion.”163 Given the extent of 
suffering endured by certain communities and regions, the Commission 
focused extensively on communal reparations as well. The Commission 
thus urged the “adoption of socio-economic and cultural development 
projects” tailored to those cities and regions, and “specifically recom-
mended the conversion of former illegal detention centers.”164 The report 
also outlines specific measures that the Moroccan government and civil 
society can undertake to guarantee nonrepetition in the future.165 Finally, 
the report addresses the need for official acknowledgement of wrong-
doing by recommending that the Prime Minister apologize publicly for 
past abuses.166 
The IER reparations program ultimately covered approximately 16,000 
individuals.167 About $85 million in reparations was distributed to bene-
ficiaries.168 These beneficiaries received compensation checks, which 
                                                                                                             
 158. Commission for Equity and Reconciliation, supra note 157. As part of its task to 
unveil the truth, the Commission is responsible for “[r]edressing damages to the victims 
and/or their inheritors through material compensation, rehabilitation, social integration, 
and all other adequate means of reparations.” Id. 
 159. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41. 
 160. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 45. 
 161. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41. The IER held seven public hearings, 
which were widely attended and at times included the King’s senior advisers, government 
officials, opposition party leaders, diplomats, international press, and civil society repre-
sentatives. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 47. 
 162. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 44. 
 163. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41; ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 44; 
MOROCCAN EQUITY AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, supra note 144, at 1. 
 164. MOROCCAN EQUITY AND RECONCILIATION COMM’N, supra note 144, at 2. 
 165. ICTJ Morocco Overview, supra note 41. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
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included a letter of apology from the State.169 Minimum payouts to vic-
tims were set at 15,000 dirham (approximately $200 in 2006).170 In addi-
tion, all victims were eligible to receive health care.171 The Moroccan 
government funded the bulk of the reparations program with some assis-
tance from the European Union.172 
Due to the restriction against identifying individual perpetrators, the 
IER has been criticized for maintaining impunity.173 The subsequent fail-
ure to prosecute or recommend the prosecution of individuals has rein-
forced the belief “some victims may feel that reparations without accoun-
tability is only limited justice.”174 
The IER was also criticized for not doing more to publicize its work 
and ensure victims adequate notification of the application deadline.175 
This is partially attributable to the large size of Morocco and the many 
remote communities disconnected from the national media.176 Any repa-
rations program in Bahrain should draw from the Moroccan experience 
by undertaking a comprehensive public information strategy aimed at 
making Bahraini victims aware of available compensation and the rele-
vant deadlines. This should not be difficult given Bahrain’s “highly de-
veloped” communications infrastructure and the small size of the coun-
try.177 
                                                                                                             
 169. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 48. The one-page letter acknowledged and 
apologized for government human rights violations. The package also included a ruling 
on the victim’s individual case, detailing “the specific violations to which the victim was 
subjected and the amount allocated as compensation.” Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 49. For many victims,  
moral and legal measures of reparations are fundamental, while monetary com-
pensation is controversial and problematic. . . . [V]ictims ask for official and 
societal acknowledgement that they were wronged, restoration of their good 
name, [and] knowledge of who and how it was done. . . . [C]ompensation was 
never enough, or even the most important thing. They especially note the hol-
lowness of material reparations when there has been no pronounced reluctance 
to prosecute those responsible.  
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 26, at 180 (discussing the findings of the comparative study by 
the Chilean human rights organization Corporación de Promoción y Defensa de los De-
rechos del Pueblo). 
 174. ICTJ WORKSHOP, supra note 143, at 49. 
 175. Id. The IER received 8000 applications after the one-month deadline. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. C.I.A. World Factbook: Bahrain, supra note 8. Bahrain has a “highly developed” 
communications infrastructure and a total land area of 665 sq km (compared to Moroc-
co’s 446,300 sq km). Id. Bahrain is also one of the most urbanized countries in the world, 
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CONCLUSION 
Both the story of victim’s rights under international law and the story 
of Bahrain’s transitional justice experience are far from written. Efforts 
to close the gap between the rhetoric of human rights and the enforce-
ment of such rights must remain a top priority. The inability of Bahraini 
torture victims to access justice at either the regional or international lev-
el underscores this need. The U.N. General Assembly’s adoption of the 
2006 Basic Principles marks an important step in the evolution of human 
rights law towards a more “victimcentric” framework,178 but the doctrine 
must be translated into action in order to protect “the inherent dignity . . . 
of all members of the human family” on which “freedom, justice and 
peace in the world” is based.179 
In Bahrain, recent human rights developments serve as a reminder that 
there are many obstacles to overcome in guaranteeing respect for essen-
tial human rights at the domestic level.180 Nevertheless, there are also 
positive signs that some degree of justice may be forthcoming for Ba-
hraini victims of state abuse. In June 2007, eleven Bahraini human rights 
organizations and opposition groups took the unprecedented step of 
forming a reconciliation pressure group to lobby the government for the 
creation of a truth and reconciliation committee (“TRC”) to address hu-
man rights abuses committed by the government from the 1970s to the 
1990s.181 However, there has been no indication that the TRC will be-
come official through government support or participation, or by grant-
                                                                                                             
as its small population of 708,000 is heavily concentrated in the country’s two major 
cities, Manama and al-Muharraq, and in main towns such as Jidd Hafs, Sitra, al-Rifaa, 
and Madinat. HRW, ROUTINE ABUSE, ROUTINE DENIAL, supra note 5, at 9. 
 178. Bassiouni, supra note 2, at 204. 
 179. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 42, prmbl. 
 180. See Bahrain Center for Human Rights, BCHR: Arbitrary Detention and Unfair 
Trials in Bahrain During 2006, http://www.bahrainrights.org/en/node/1626 (last visited 
Dec. 4, 2007) (“The year 2006 has witnessed an extreme decline in public freedoms in 
Bahrain, especially in regards to freedom of expression and opinion and the freedom of 
assembly.”); International Freedom of Expression eXchange, Bahrain: Twenty-Six IFEX 
Members Slam Government’s Latest Attack on Free Expression, http://canada.ifex. 
org/en/content/view/full/88152/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2007) (calling upon the Bahraini 
authorities to “halt their attacks upon freedom of expression, to abolish abusive laws, and 
to respect their commitment to international charters and covenants, in particular Article 
19 of the ICCPR.”). 
 181. Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace Arab Reform Bulletin: July/Aug. 2007, su-
pra note 127. Suggestions for the TRC’s potential mandate included truth-finding and 
compensation payments to those who sustained injuries or were subjected to torture, de-
portation, or arbitrary arrest. Members also called for punishment of those allegedly re-
sponsible for torture in direct contravention of Decree 56, which pardoned all political 
prisoners and perpetrators responsible for human rights violations. Id. 
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ing TRC investigators access to files or personnel.182 Still, a follow-up 
coalition meeting was held in September 2007 and included the partici-
pation of representatives from the International Center for Transitional 
Justice.183 While the TRC’s launch date was set for December 10, 2007, 
the anniversary of the UDHR,184 no announcement has been made at the 
time of writing. 
Bahrain appears to be at a crossroads. For the Al-Khalifa regime, pro-
longed inaction without officially confronting and remedying past abuses 
risks igniting wide-scale civil unrest comparable to levels witnessed in 
the 1990s, or worse.185 Such a risk is compounded by the growing influ-
ence of Shiite Iran in regional affairs, and regional destabilization caused 
by the ongoing sectarian violence in nearby Iraq.186 Widespread civil un-
rest in Bahrain would also be detrimental to the United States and Saudi 
Arabia, which depend on the ruling regime and the stability of the island 
kingdom in pursuing their respective geopolitical and economic inter-
ests.187 On the other hand, official measures of reparation would build
                                                                                                             
 182. Prospects for Transitional Justice in Bahrain, supra note 38, at 2. The govern-
ment remains steadfast in its position that the 2002 pardon remains valid, and that the 
pardon includes all parties. As such, explained Social Development Minister Fatima al-
Balooshi, “[T]he law does not allow for review of cases that fall within the timeframe of 
the pardon . . . .” DPA: Bahraini NGO’s, Opposition Launch Truth and Reconciliation 
Panel, DEUTSCHE PRESS-AGENTUR, June 27, 2007. 
 183. Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace Arab Reform Bulletin: Oct. 2007, Bahrain: 
NDI Returns; Cabinet Change; Anti-Corruption Efforts, http://www.carnegieendowment. 
org/arb/?fa=showIssue&backIssue=10/1/2007 (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). 
 184. Id. 
 185. For coverage of escalated clashes between state Security forces and protesters, see 
Michael Slackman, Sectarian Tension Takes Volatile Form in Bahrain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
27, 2009; Bahrain: Shi’ite Riots Orchestrated, MIDDLE EAST NEWSLINE, June 12, 2007; 
Human Rights Watch, Bahrain: Jailed Protesters Show Signs of Severe Abuse, June 1, 
2007, http://hrw.org.english/docs/2007/06/01/bahrail6051_txt.htm; Three Policemen In-
jured in Third Day of Bahrain Violence, KHALEEJ TIMES, May 22, 2007. 
 186. See CRS REPORT RL 31533, supra note 7. 
 187. See CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 95-1013, supra note 15; Prospects for Transi-
tional Justice in Bahrain, supra note 38. 
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upon the encouraging precedent established in Morocco while demon-
strating that political survival and respect for human rights are not mu-
tually exclusive in the Middle East of tomorrow. 
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